GLOO

Gloo is a newly public (shares +192% YoY, likely SPAC/IPO) faith-and-flourishing AI platform with genuinely eye-catching top-line growth: revenue tripled from $23.2M (FY2025) to $94.7M (FY2026), +307.7%, with the 10-K citing 20+ customers at >$1M annual contract value. But the growth is the least of the story. The company is deeply unprofitable and the losses are getting worse in absolute terms, not better: net loss widened to -$157M from -$85.7M, operating loss -$108M, operating margin -114.3% and net margin -166.0%. Gloo is spending more than two dollars for every dollar of revenue it books, and management's own strategy — 'taking on more of the work our customers have historically performed internally,' assuming customer technology operations with 'forward-deployed engineering' — describes a labor-heavy, low-margin services model, which helps explain how revenue can quadruple while margins stay catastrophically negative. This is not a high-margin software P&L; it reads like services/AI-reselling revenue bought at negative gross economics.

The decisive problem is the balance sheet against the burn. Operating cash flow was -$80.5M for FY2026, and the company holds just $57.3M of cash. That is well under one year of runway at the current burn rate. With retained deficit at -$40.1M and D&A of only $11.2M (so the loss is overwhelmingly cash, not non-cash), Gloo will almost certainly need to raise capital — equity or debt — in the near term. Given shares already grew 192% YoY, existing holders face material further dilution, and the P/S of 1.1 that looks 'cheap' is cheap precisely because the market is pricing in that dilution and the possibility the model never reaches profitability.