SCOR

Comscore is a classic deep-value turnaround that isn't fully fixed. After three years of brutal losses (-$50M, -$66.6M, -$79.4M, then -$60.2M), FY2025 net loss narrowed dramatically to -$10.0M. The MD&A makes clear why: the swing to a +$4.51M operating profit (1.3% margin, from a -16.7% loss in 2024) is almost entirely the absence of goodwill impairment — $63.0M was charged in 2024 and $78.2M in 2023, versus zero in 2025. Strip that out and the underlying business barely moved: revenue was flat at $357M (+0.4%), cost of revenue actually rose to 59.5% of sales, and the company still posted a net loss after a -$5.9M FX hit and interest expense that more than tripled to -$6.7M. This is a no-growth measurement business (revenue is below its $376M FY2022 level) fighting entrenched competition, exactly the risks management foregrounds: a 'highly competitive' market, subscription customers that 'could terminate, reduce or fail to renew,' and the blunt admission that it 'may continue to incur net losses and may not achieve profitability.'

The valuation screens cheap — P/S of 0.3 and a market cap of just $106M against $22.7M of operating cash flow (+25.6%) on under $1M of capex, an implied free-cash-flow yield around 20%. That cash generation, not the headline P/E, is the real bull case. Ignore the reported 1.7x P/E and $4.25 'diluted EPS': those are inconsistent with a -$10.0M net loss and an underlying loss per share, almost certainly an artifact of the preferred/share-count restructuring (shares outstanding jumped +205.8% and equity +1448.7% as preferred converted). The P/E is not usable here.